Small Cause Court Suit

Respondents filed S.C.C. suit for eviction of appellants from suit premises claiming title to the premises on the basis of a decree for specific per­formance passed against the landlords of the appel­lants. Appellants challenged the title of respondents contending that the decree was fraudulent­ly obtained. The finding of S. C. Court is sub­stance has established that respondents succeed­ed in proving the relationship of landlord and tenant. But the S. C. Court proceeded to exam­ine the paramount title of the respondents and held that the decree for specific performance was fraudulently obtained and therefore the respondents did not acquire title to the suit premises and dismissed that suit.

S.C.C. Judge had no jurisdiction to go into the question of paramount title, and in doing so to set aside the decree of a civil Court obtained by predecessor of the plaintiff in a suit for specific performance of contract. The Small Causes Court has no jurisdiction to go into the question of title, except incidentally…… (4) 

Restitution application is not an applica­tion for execution of a decree

An application for restitution is an independ­ent application, no matter its object is the recov­ery of the fruit of a decree passed earlier but subsequently reversed. Application for restitution is an application for which no limitation has been specifically provided for in the law and as such it attracts the residuary provision of Art. 181. A restitution application is not an applica­tion for execution of a decree and as such it is not governed by Art. 182 but it is governed by Art. 181 of the Limitation Act.

Right to apply for restitution accrues under Art. 181 from the date of the final decree when appeal is preferred from appeallate decree of reversal and not from the date of the decree of first appellate Court reversing the decree of the trial Court-Limitation Act (IX of 1908), Art. 181

In a case where second appeal is filed challenging the decree of reversal of the first appellate Court and restitution takes place during pendency of second appeal, the restitution may be set at naught by the reversal of the decree in the second appeal and possession of the property will change hands once again……. (14, 15 & 17) 

The appointment letter was issued by Mistake-

No selection by the Selection Board

The respon­dent was never selected by the Selection Board, but somehow by mistake the appointment letter was issued. In the absence of selection by the Board the appointment was invalid. Between the interview and the date when he got the appoint­ment letter there is hardly anything to show that he was selected by the Selection Board. An ingenious attempt was made by arguing that appointment letter itself would mean that he was selected by the Board but this argument loses its validity when the appointment letter is questioned on the ground of bona fide mistake. Mistake pre-supposes non-application of mind and in such case no right accrued to the respon­dent.........(6 & 7) 

Whether the Government was within its rights to take over possession of the tea garden and other movables of the petitioners-

It is petitioners' inalienable right to enjoy the pro­tection of the law and to be treated in accordance with law, and in accordance with law as guaranteed under Article 31.

No notice as required un­der the law was ever served upon the peti­tioners by the government which is a violation of the rule of audi alteram partem. The petitioners were in possession of the garden in 1975 and the learned Assistant Attorney General had no answer as to how the government could re-enter and take possession without the inter­vention of the court. Viewed from any stand point, it must be held that the impugned ac­tion of the government was illegal and without jurisdiction. It necessarily follows that the petitioners' inalienable right to enjoy the pro­tection of the law and to be treated in accor­dance with law, and in accordance with law as guaranteed under Article 31 of the Constitu­tion has been clearly infringed…….(27) 

Discharge of the accused by the Magistrate under sec­tion 253 Cr.P.C.

The accused petitioner is not sought to be tried by a different Tribunal. Nor is he be­ing tried under a separate rule of evidence. Records of the case shows the same witness.

The accused has deposed to the same effect and has not deposed anything in respect of selling of the cloths in the black market. There was neither any fresh complaint or FIR against the accused petitioner nor was there any fresh police enquiry report against him. The accused petitioner was also not being tried before a separate Tribunal altogether. He was being tried by the same Court. As such revival of proceedings against him in respect of the same offence was illegal and without jurisdiction. 

Transferee court may punish for violation of an order of injunction-

Order 39, Rule 2(3) empowered the court to punish for disobedience of any term or breach of an order' granting, an injunction. So the words of the sub-rule appear to mean that an exercise of the power must be limited to the court granting the injunction and should not be exercised by any other court which may be in seisin of the suit but has not granted the injunction. the court granting injunction would be the only court competent to pass an order under order 39, Rule 2(3) C.P.C. for the breach of the order of injunction. In that view of the matter, we are of the opinion that the transferee court to which the case is transferred under section 24 of the C.P.C. is competent to deal with the cases of breach of injunction and not to be confined with the court granting an in­junction…….(5)

In a case of transfer under sec. 24 the whole case is transferred and as such the transferee court has session over the entire matter of the suit-

When a case is transferred from one court to another it means not only the transfer of the suit but the entire proceeding including the ancillary proceedings and hence all the matters are to be disposed of by the Transferee court……………….(4)